Operation Barbarossa: Turning Point in WW2

Identification and Evaluation of Sources

Operation Barbarossa oversaw the conflict between two titanic world powers and the clash of radically opposed ideologies. Germany’s eventual defeat prompted numerous analyses by historians ever since the conclusion of war. This investigation will explore these contesting perspectives, ultimately seeking to answer: What was the most important factor which caused the failure of Operation Barbarossa in World War 2?

An enlightening source, Liddell Hart’s The German Generals Talk: Startling revelations from Hitler’s high command published in 1948, presents a synthesis of orthodox interpretation and military analysis. Thee origin is valuable because historian Liddell Hart was a British soldier and military theorist specialising in mechanised warfare, granting him a comprehensive understanding of German Blitzkrieg tactics which is particularly relevant to this investigation. After WW2, Liddel Hart conducted extensive interviews with high-ranking German military officials; the incorporation of these primary accounts makes the content of the source useful, as it provides insight into relevant perspectives within the German command. Though the author’s intended purpose for the source is to “present an intelligible form [of history] for the public” , the considerable research and analysis nonetheless makes the source valuable for historians studying Operation Barbarossa. However, the origin of the source also presents limitations: published immediately after the war, Liddell Hart lacked the opportunity to study a wide range of works; hence he was restricted to receiving heavy influence from these German generals, whose explanations may be biased and self-serving at times to minimise war-crime penalty. The author has also been accused of promoting the “Rommel myth” and the “clean Wehrmacht” argument; this emotive and opinionated stance is occasionally reflected in his writing , which renders the content potentially unreliable.

Another illuminating source, James Ellman’s Hitler’s Great Gamble: a New Look at German Strategy, Operation Barbarossa, and the Axis Defeat in World War II published in 2019, is an example of relevant revisionist historiography which challenges the interpretations of the orthodox. The origin of the source is valuable because the relatively recent publication date indicates the author would have benefitted from hindsight and ample resources already available for this topic, hence allowing a more developed and thought-out argument. The content is also relevant and useful as the source specifically focuses on historiography around Operation Barbarossa, presenting valuable evidence which argues against established traditionalist beliefs. Furthermore, Ellman believes that “[aspects of Barbarossa] have been overlooked or misinterpreted” , thus the purpose of his writing is clearly defined as an “attempt to shed new light on [the] analysis”; his bold contention against conventional wisdom led to the formation of a fresh revisionist interpretation. Therefore, the goal-driven purpose has facilitated extensive research and critical analysis of perspectives, making the source tremendously valuable for historians studying Operation Barbarossa. However, one limitation of the source is the origin; while Ellman also holds a bachelor’s degree in history, his main specialty lies in economics and he has been a global institutional investor for the past two decades . Hence, his relatively recent entry into writing analytical history decreases the reliability of the content.

Investigation

On 22nd June 1941, Hitler launched the largest military invasion in history, code-named Operation Barbarossa . This tremendous undertaking, embodying radical Nazi ideological principles , was designed to bring Germany a swift victory; instead, it became a humiliating defeat . The Operation’s failure undoubtedly altered the course of history and its significance is apparent through the heated debate over Barbarossa’s primary flaw . While orthodox historians emphasise the fault of Hitler’s inappropriate interference , more recent historiography from revisionist historian James Ellman accentuates the German diplomatic failure to capitalise on the strength of Axis allies . To provide further perspective, military historians highlight the complications caused by geographical and climatic conditions as the crucial factor which led to the Russian victory . While acknowledging that these interconnected causes combined to propel Germany to defeat, the effect of traditionally proposed factors is nonetheless overestimated as they were mitigated to a certain extent; hence, poor German diplomacy is arguably the most important factor which failed Operation Barbarossa.

Orthodox historians argue the main reason for Barbarossa’s failure was Hitler’s erroneous judgement to alter the invasion objective. Senior military staff, namely Bock, Hoth, and Guderian, urged the earliest possible capture of Moscow , hopeful that remaining Soviet resistance would cease after the capitulation of the capital . Hitler, however, took into account economic and political considerations; he favoured capturing the northern port city of Leningrad and the southern Soviet industrial and agricultural heartland of Ukraine . Overruling his generals, Hitler ordered the divergence of forces from army-group-centre to aid northern and southern attacks. Orthodox historian Stolfi argues “a war that could have been won in August 1941 irrevocably slipped away. […] had the Germans reached Moscow […] they would have won the campaign and war.” Similarly, Theodore Ropp refers to this decision as “[Hitler’s] greatest blunder […] his August postponement of the drive on Moscow cannot be defended.” Orthadox historians held this view due to their influence by primary source accounts; for example, General Erich von Manstein suggests that Hitler failed to achieve a uniform strategic policy with the Oberkommando des Heeres, and it was this conflict over territorial objectives that prevented the decisive victory over the USSR . However, Manstein’s perspective is likely biased by his personal participation in the military. Other historiographic schools also questioned the significance of this factor; military historian Van Creveld’s analysis suggests that the logistical situation couldn’t sustain army-group-centre’s advance on Moscow . If only a fraction of panzer divisions could be deployed, then it is difficult for the under-armed Wehrmacht to prevail against fierce Soviet defence . Moreover, Russian soldiers have historically demonstrated persistence despite severe military defeats . Revisionist historian Robert Kirchubel argues that capturing the capital would not ensure USSR’s collapse, as Soviet Commander Timoshenko declared: “[the fall of Moscow] will not win [Germany] the war” . Therefore, while the lack of a unified invasion policy hindered the German offensive, it was not the conclusive factor for the failure of Barbarossa.

A distinct perspective held by military historians depicts Barbarossa’s collapse as a result of geographical and climatic conditions which allowed Russians troops to evade the Wehrmacht’s characterising speed. Though German Blitzkrieg tactics proved effective in Western and Central Europe, it was negated by the extensiveness of the Eastern terrain . While the opening invasion force was sufficient in penetrating enemy lines, the attritional losses of panzer divisions rendered the attacking force incompetent at maintaining its initial speed; the vast distances dissipated the shock value of the Blitzkrieg as it made supply logistics extremely complicated . Military historian David Glantz also notes the harsh Russian climate as a factor which nullified the speed of the invasion . Testifying this view, General Gerd von Rundstedt recounted the “black earth” of Ukraine turning into “impenetrable quagmires” during rain, causing severe delays and prevented successful encircling movements; however, this view is likely influenced by Rundstedt’s involvement in the Wehrmacht. Furthermore, as German forces reached deeper into Russian territory, the feasibility of launching effective offensives drastically decreased, attributed to logistical strains on German resource lines. Glantz states “the underdeveloped road system and the different gauge track employed in the Soviet railroad system made movement exceedingly difficult.” The effect of these logistical impediments caused the Wehrmacht’s inability to sustain Blitzkrieg-style operations in the harsh climate and primitive Eastern theatre of war . However, the unfavourable geography and climate proved inconclusive at deeming the Axis powers incapable of fighting a long war in the interior of the USSR . The superior quality of German weaponry counteracted the quantitative imbalance benefitting Russia; the takeover of major industrial, agricultural, and population bases also reduced logistical strain , hence the effect of climatic and geographical disadvantages was felt to a lesser extent. Statistical evidence shows subsequent offensives launched in 1942 to be successful in penetrating the Red Army’s front lines despite being deep inside Russian territory . Therefore, while being a major reason, the hindrance caused by natural conditions was not the most important factor for the failure of Operation Barbarossa.

Recent historiography from James Ellman provides a revised explanation: Germany’s diplomatic failure to convince her most militarily potent allies, Finland and Japan, to maintain military action against the USSR was the proximate cause to the Operation’s failure . While antipathy for the USSR devised the German-Japanese alliance, Hitler did little to strengthen the bond . Berlin neglected to inform Tokyo regarding intentions of the 1939 Non-aggression Pact; this absence of strategic coordination undermined Japan’s trust in Germany . As a result, Japan did not view the pact as political manoeuvring, but rather as violation to the 1936 Anti-Comintern agreement . Motivated by both fear of Stalin turning his attention to the East and a desire to conquer the Pacific, Japan eventually signed the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1941 . Without Japanese aggression along the Manchurian border, Ellman argues that spared Siberian formations deployed against Germany and vital war materials imported from Vladivostok were decisive in denying a German victory . Finland, on the other hand, initially cooperated with army-group-north, sharing the objective of eradicating supply-lines from Murmansk . Seemingly satisfied with their immediate war gains, the Finns soon chose to halt military action under increasing diplomatic pressures from Britain and the US . Germany’s error of diplomacy in the North stems from impotence to convince Finland that partial destruction was insufficient, victory required complete annihilation of the USSR . Despite successes of the early months of Barbarossa, the rail link from Murmansk remained intact and the influx of vital materials proved critical for Soviet resistance; historian Paul Carell wrote, “Day after day Murmansk was increasingly revealing its true significance. […] ultimately decided the German-Russian war” . Diplomatic miscalculation of Germany is arguably the most important cause for Barbarossa’s failure. Inadequate involvement of Finland and Japan indirectly led to the previous factors: Finnish abandonment motivated the divergence of forces from army-group-centre to the north and Japanese inactivity allowed Russia to concentrate resources against Germany, amplifying logistical pressure on the Wehrmacht. Therefore, to a significant extent, the primary factor for the failure of Barbarossa was Germany’s inability to capitalise on her allies’ military strength.

History often demonstrates that causes are interwoven; perfectly layered factors combine to culminate to one fateful event. Operation Barbarossa is no exception, prompting historians of different schools to propose varying weightings of these factors. Orthodox historians emphasise the flaw of Hitler’s decisions; while his poor command was certainly a hindrance, statistical evidence suggests that any alternative invasion plan was infeasible due to the outstretched resource lines. Conversely, military historians blame the geographical and climatic conditions which rendered the Wehrmacht’s offensives incapable of maintaining pace. Despite this, evidence from 1942 demonstrates that Germany’s superior weaponry and vehicles could still prevail against the USSR. Ultimately, revisionist historiography argues that failure to capitalise on the geopolitical positioning of Finland and Japan was Germany’s greatest downfall as it indirectly exacerbated the effect of above-mentioned factors. Therefore to a great extent was German diplomatic failure the primary blunder in Operation Barbarossa.

Reflection

This investigation allowed me to experience methods used by historians, as well as the challenges which they face. During my research, primary source accounts such as those from Liddel Hart’s works are frequently encountered and build the basis for many historiographic arguments revolving around Operation Barbarossa. While I acknowledge they are valuable for providing a representation of perspectives from the past, it is nevertheless important to realise that these primary accounts rely on the perspective of an individual. The potential biases within their stories made me realise that we must question the accuracy of personal knowledge and evaluate critically how the emotion and memory of the individual may distort their perception of the past.

The ample research into Operation Barbarossa has generated a wealth of information, both benefiting and challenging historians; it becomes difficult to select relevant and reliable sources from this vast collection. To combat this, I made a constant effort during my research to thoroughly analyse the origin and purpose of each work. When selecting sources, another challenge arises, known as motivated reasoning bias, which is where the historian’s choice of evidence is influenced by their personal beliefs, attitudes, and experiences, or selected to fulfill a preconceived argument. This phenomenon was made apparent to me as I found myself prioritising certain sources which are more appealing to my argument.

Unlike mathematics and the natural sciences, there is no “absolute truth” in the field of history; even when the same statistical evidence is presented to different historians, a range of interpretations can arise. Perhaps, this is a two edged sword; while it gives rise to variety and allows for revision, the wide range of contrasting arguments also prompted me to question the extent to which one particular historian’s perspective can construct objective history. While we must acknowledge that all reasonable interpretations are correct, it is also important to realise that some are more justified than others. Thus it becomes the responsibility of historians to consider a broad range of perspectives, accentuate those that are more justified, and then arrive at a reasoned conclusion.

A challenge more specific to older historical events such as Operation Barbarossa is the contention against the orthodox; it becomes increasingly difficult to argue against established beliefs which have spread into the minds of many. Nevertheless, historical revisionism should be encouraged, as it is a necessary process towards gaining a more accurate understanding of the past.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my instructor, Miss Lucy Irwin, and my fellow classmates of Rangitoto College IB class of 2021 for the amazingly meaningful and insightful discussions throughout the entire programme. Without whom and which, the completion of this work would not be possible.

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